Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors (8/6/03) By Robert C. Pozen
In two other articles in this issue of the Business Lawyer, Lucian Bebchuk and Martin Lipton argue respectively for and against shareholder nominations of corporate directors. Given the eloquence of both these authors, this article will not attempt to restate or criticize their arguments. Instead, this article will review the practical issues that the SEC would have to resolve in order to make workable any system for shareholder nomination of directors.
In particular, this article takes the viewpoint of institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds 1 , which control over half of the publicly traded equities in the United States. 2 As explained almost a decade ago 3 , institutional investors are "reluctant" activists that almost never seek to obtain control of the board of a publicly traded company because of legal restrictions or practical constraints. Thus, this article addresses situations where shareholders are seeking to nominate only one or two directors to the board of a publicly held company. This article will begin by presenting the cost-benefit framework utilized by most institutional investors in evaluating whether to be "activist" -defined to mean doing something more than voting proxies in a diligent fashion. While this review will touch upon various categories of costs and benefits, it will focus on those most relevant to shareholders nominations of directors. Then this article will apply this cost-benefit Jan-Feb 1994, 140-149. framework to the five alternative methods, suggested by the ABA Task Force ("ABA Task Force") on shareholder proposals, for increasing shareholder participation in nominating corporate directors, as well as the sixth alternative of cumulative voting.
These five alternatives are:
1. enhancing the input of shareholders into the processes of the nominating committee of the company's board, 2. allotting specific board positions for nomination by shareholders through the nominating committee of the company's board, 3. simplifying independent proxy solicitations for so-called short lists of shareholder-nominated directors, 4. permitting shareholders to use the company's proxy machinery to solicit proxies for their own nominees, and 5. allowing more leeway for shareholder proposals defining the process of nominating directors for a specific company.
A. Cost-Benefit Framework
The Wall Street Rule is alive and well. In most cases when institutional investors are dissatisfied with the performance of a company's directors or executives, these investors simply sell the stock. Selling the stock sends a signal to the company, while not imposing any costs (other than trading costs) on institutional investors.
In a small number of cases, however, institutional investors may consider whether to sell the stock or, alternatively, to hold the stock and engage in activism in an effort to change a significant policy or strategy of the company at issue. 4 As mentioned above, activism means more than voting proxies diligently. Activism can take many forms --for example, waging a proxy fight, submitting a shareholder proposal or simply publishing a list of so-called corporate underperformers. In deciding whether to engage in any form of activism, institutions usually weigh the various costs likely to be incurred in activist activities against the magnitude and probability of expected benefits of such activism.
Costs
The various categories of costs involved with institutional activism include some items that are relatively easy to calculate and other items that are extremely difficult to predict. The easily calculable items are the out-of-pocket costs associated with the particular form of activism selected -for example, the printing and mailing costs incurred with a proxy solicitation for a shareholder nominee, or the advertising expenses associated with publishing lists of so-called corporate underperformers.
One difficult expense to estimate is the time of senior executives and investment personnel who participate in an institution's activism. When a large manager of mutual funds or pension assets actively promotes a change in a company's business strategy, a senior executive of the manager must spend considerable time making sure that the right message is conveyed to the company, that press relations are handled properly, and that the trustees of the mutual fund or pension plan are kept apprised of the activism.
Similarly, while investment professionals generally do not participate in routine proxy votes (which are typically handled by an internal proxy voting team), they must take the time to provide guidance to the proxy voting team when a substantial holding in their portfolio becomes the subject of activism by their own manager (or by another institution). The time of senior executives and investment professionals is very expensive, and the amount of their time necessary to implement or support an activist strategy is almost impossible to predict.
Another difficult expense to predict is litigation cost because it is unclear whether institutional activism will stimulate litigation by company management or other opponents of the strategy pursued by the institution. CHANGE 277, 284-90 (1996) .
than his or her formal affiliation to the company, that determines the quality of a director. 12 Some of the best directors are "interested" and some of the worst directors are "disinterested."
Thus, institutional investors will not be likely to nominate an independent director for a company merely because it ranks relatively low on one of the several published indices of good corporate governance. 13 The necessary, but not sufficient, condition for institutional nomination of an independent director is that the company at issue is performing poorly as measured by stock price or earnings relative to an appropriate peer group of companies. In addition, most institutions will not nominate a company director unless they believe that an independent voice is highly likely to result in a substantial increase in the financial value of the company. 14 For instance, suppose a public company is engaging in a series of transactions at inflated prices in favor of a private firm owned by someone who also controls 20% of the public company's stock and who tends to dominate its board of directors. In that instance, the election of one or two independent directors to that public company's board is highly likely to result in a repricing, or even elimination, of those related party transactions.
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One final aspect of the benefit side of institutional activism is the question of "free riders": 16 that is, who receives the benefits if an institutional investor makes the expenditure to nominate and elect a director for a poorly performing company, and that director substantially enhances the price of the company's stock? The answer is that all the shareholders of the company benefit, although only that one institutional investor has incurred the costs of activism. If the SEC wishes to encourage activism by institutional investors on director nominations, it should figure out a reasonable way for other beneficiaries of institutional activism to contribute proportionately to the costs incurred by the activist institution. under the cost-benefit framework generally used by institutional investors in evaluating whether to engage in activism.
Increasing Shareholder Input into Nominating Committees
Under this first alternative, shareholders holding more than a specified percentage of the company's voting stock would be eligible to submit candidates for directors to the nominating committee of the company's board. "affiliates" or "participants" in Internet proxy solicitations in order to "facilitate shareholder involvement in elections".
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The likelihood of actually electing director candidates put forward by institutional investors would be significantly lower under this short list alternative than under the second alternative, which allots a specified number of board seats to shareholdernominated candidates. Company management would probably oppose the election of one or two shareholder-nominated candidates, since they would necessarily compete against one or two members of the company slate selected by its own nominating committee. In addition, the institutional activist would be more exposed to legal risks (discussed above)
if it nominated director candidates and directly solicited proxies for them, as compared to submitting their candidates to the company's nominating committee. Since candidates on a short list directly promoted by an institutional investor might well be considered its "representatives" by the courts, the institution would have to establish special fire walls to avoid possible legal liabilities for insider trading or short-swing profits.
On the other hand, the ABA's suggestions on conducting proxy solicitations for short lists over the Internet constitute a potential breakthrough on the costs of institutional activism. At present, the expense involved with mailing proxy cards to millions of shareholders is daunting. The cost savings would be enormous if an institution could attach proxy voting cards for a short list of director candidates to proxy materials distributed over the Internet to company shareholders. Similarly, the support of other institutions for such a short list would be significantly enhanced if they could abide by the terms of a SEC "safe harbor", so they would not be considered "participants" or "affiliates" in an Internet proxy solicitation by the proponent of a short list.
30 Id. at 15.
However, it remains to be seen whether an Internet-only solicitation of proxies would be sufficient to result in the actual election of director candidates nominated by shareholders. Shareholders must normally spend millions of dollars -e.g., on proxy solicitors, newspaper advertisements, and litigation -to win a proxy vote on directors
elections. Yet even victorious director candidates may recoup their election expenses from the company only upon a majority vote of its board. If shareholders nominate a short list of only one on two director candidates, they will never gain control of the company's board so they are not likely to obtain board approval for the company's reimbursement of their election expenses. This fourth approach would reduce the costs to a shareholder of soliciting proxies for their director candidates by including a supporting statement for such candidates in the proxy materials sent out by the company. Again this alternative would be available only to shareholders holding a minimum number of shares, who were prepared to submit the required information to the company. Furthermore, the SEC would establish a limit on the total number of shareholder candidates to be included in any company proxy statement, 32 a limit on the length and nature of any material supporting such candidates, as well as deadlines for submitting such material to the company. 31 After prevailing in derivative suits, some shareholders have persuaded courts to require a company to reimburse their attorneys' fees on the theory that the derivative suit conferred benefits on all company shareholders. In contrast to the first and second alternatives, this fourth alternative (like the third alternative on short lists) would provide no role for the company's own nominating committee in selecting director candidates put forward by shareholders. This means that candidates nominated by a large institutional investor would most surely be included on the ballot for a company's election of directors. On the other hand, such director candidates would almost certainly be opposed by company management since they would implicitly be competing for board seats against members of the company's slate of directors. As in the third alternative, this fourth alternative would also involve substantial legal risks to the proponent institution, which would have to establish fire walls to avoid a judicial determination that a director nominated and supported by the institution "represented" that institution on the company board. would exclude only three types of shareholders proposals -those preventing the election of a particular nominee as a director, those commenting on an individual who is a director nominee, and those that would operate to change the control of the company.
Given the heated debate on the question of the appropriate level and type of shareholder involvement in the director nomination process, it would be quite sensible to decide upon an answer customized for a specific company. In arriving at such a 33 ABA Task Force Letter at 21.
customized answer, institutional investors should have a substantial say as the largest shareholders in most publicly traded companies. Yet the ABA Task Force states that shareholder proposals defining shareholder involvement in the director nomination process "might be precatory in nature or mandatory in nature, as permitted under the applicable corporation law". 34 Thus, if state corporate law is interpreted to preclude a mandatory bylaw on the director nomination process put forward as part of a shareholder proposal, 35 company boards would be free to ignore any such proposal -even if it were approved by an overwhelming majority of the company's shareholders.
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Conclusions and Sixth Alternative
The SEC has announced that it intends to propose rules that would enhance shareholder involvement in the process of nominating directors of publicly traded companies in the U.S. 37 In proposing such rules, the SEC should take into consideration the cost-benefit analysis utilized by most institutional investors before embarking upon shareholder activism. While institutional investors are the largest shareholders in most publicly traded companies, they may be reluctant to become activist regarding the nomination process for company directors because enhancements to this process are not directly related to the stock price or net income of a financially sound company in normal From the perspective of institutional investors, the first and second alternatives outlined by the ABA Task Force involve both modest costs and modest benefits. In the first and second alternatives, the institution simply submits a few names to the company's nominating committee, which is free to reject any director candidates put forward by any shareholder. By contrast, the costs of winning a proxy contest for a short list of shareholder-nominated directors under alternative three could be quite high, even if proxy cards could be distributed by the Internet along with the required proxy disclosures.
While the fourth alternative would reduce the costs to shareholders of soliciting proxies for their director nominees, the inclusion of supporting statements for such nominees in the company's own proxy statement may lead to investor confusion about who supports which nominees. Moreover, the expected benefits from proxy solicitations for shareholder-nominated candidates under the third or fourth alternatives are unclear, because the company is likely to push hard for its own slate of directors.
Since none of the four alternatives is compelling from the cost-benefit perspective of institutional investors, they might well favor the fifth alternative -a customized approach to the director nomination process for each company as delineated by a shareholder resolution. This approach seems to be favored by the recent SEC staff report to the Commission. 38 However, the SEC staff suggests that shareholder resolutions on the director nomination process should be permitted only after the occurrence of specified any subject supported by a majority of its shareholders, or the withholding of a significant percentage of votes for the slate of management-nominated directors. 39 On the other hand, the SEC staff rejects as "triggering events" any indicator of poor financial performance by a company, like lagging a peer index for many years, because the SEC staff believes "that any triggering event should be more closely tied to evidence of ineffectiveness in the proxy process".
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By rejecting the performance of a company's stock price as a "triggering event", the SEC staff is ignoring the key factor that is likely to motivate institutional investors to advocate shareholder involvement in a company's nominations of directors. An increase in a company's stock price directly confers substantial benefits on the clients of these institutions. In contrast to the SEC staff, most institutional investors are not interested in the quality of the proxy process for its own sake. With a few exceptions, institutional investors will not become activist in order to obtain the abstract benefit of improved governance procedures for a company with strong financial performance.
The SEC staff does a better job at understanding the cost concerns of institutional activism in regard to nominating directors. The SEC staff recognizes that nominating shareholders will be concerned about potential liability for short-swing profits under utilized to reduce the proxy solicitation costs for such candidates. 43 Yet the SEC staff does not offer any solution to the "free rider" problem that is the most serious constraint on potential activism by institutional investors. Even where an activist institution spends large amounts of time and money to change the director nomination process in a financially troubled company, the institution will not gain control of that company;
rather, even in the best of situations, the revised nominating process will lead to the election of one or two new directors, who may help improve the company's business strategy. As a result, the share price for the company would increase, but over 90% of these price increases will typically accrue to shareholders other than the activist institution.
The cost effectiveness of this fifth customized approach ultimately depends on whether shareholder resolutions concerning the director nomination process will be considered binding on the company's board or merely advisory. This question in turn depends less on SEC rules and more on state corporate law, as determined by state legislators and state judges. For example, the SEC staff would allow a shareholder resolution on the director nomination process if a company fails to implement an advisory shareholder proposal on any subject supported by a majority of shareholders.
But the staff then maintains that the shareholder resolution on the director nomination process will itself be advisory because of state law constraints. Would a company that failed to follow the majority will of its shareholders in one advisory proposal be likely to implement an advisory resolution on the director nomination process? 45 Seven jurisdictions make cumulative voting mandatory, and 14 provide for cumulative voting unless the corporation opts out, and 29 do not allow cumulative voting unless a corporation opts in. Ibid. 46 Alternatively, institutional investors might advocate changes to state corporate laws that would allow shareholders (as well as directors) to initiate the process of amending company charters in certain circumstances -a process already requiring approval from both a majority of directors and shareholders.
In short, shareholder nomination of a company's directors should happen infrequently: e.g., only when a company has a serious problem such as a continued decline in financial results or a troubling pattern of affiliated transactions. But the mechanism permitting such shareholder nominations should be established in advance, so that the mechanism can be utilized relatively quickly in these infrequent instances. If an institutional investor must wait for both the occurrence of a "triggering event" and the adoption of a resolution at the next shareholders' meeting before it can nominate a director, this is too long a delay to address a serious problem. 
